How have large naval powers affected international commerce in history? Using a panel gravity model, we investigate the interactions of wars, alliances, naval power and trade from the 18th to mid-20th centuries. Striking an alliance with a naval power helps a country's interstate commerce; fighting a naval power limits a country's interstate commerce. Further, we split this effect between an extensive effect (effect on a country's trade when fighting a naval power) and an intensive effect (effect of that power gaining more naval strength).
Introduction
The aim of this paper is to address the general question: How have large naval powers affected international trade historically? Given the basic geography of the world -great masses of land separated by large bodies of water -the ability of one country to influence another, economically, politically, or militarily, has depended in large part on seapower. It seems natural then for economic historians to analyze the historic interactions of trade (a measure of economic influence) and naval power (a measure of military influence).
In this paper we attempt to answer the question by interacting measures of naval power with measures of alliances and conflict. Controlling for other variables traditionally associated with international trade, we find a strong impact of large naval warships on trade volumes. Specifically, striking an alliance with a naval power helps a country's interstate commerce, while fighting a naval power hurts a country's interstate commerce. Further, this conclusion is robust to different measures of "naval power;" whether captured by the number of power warships utilized at the time, or by overall naval expenditures, naval fleets historically have altered the flows of international trade.
This work joins the ever-burgeoning group of papers on the applied economics of international trade. Empirically-minded trade economists have sought to assess the trade impacts of various economic disturbances and policy regimes by using some agreed-upon benchmark model. This benchmark has traditionally been the gravity model of trade, which controls for a variety of geographic, economic, and political factors. With such controls one can analyze the ceteris paribus effects of such things as exchange rate variability (Thrursby and Thursby 1987) , preferential trade arrangements (Frankel, Stein and Wei 1996) , currency unions (Rose 2000 , Flandreau 2000 , and gold standard adoption (López-Córdova and Meissner 2003) .
The effects of conflict on trade however have received much less attention among economists. Instead the conflict-trade relationship has been extensively analyzed by political scientists, and they have focused their attention to the reverse analysis -the effects of trade and other measures of international "connectivity" on the likelihood of conflict among countries (Barbieri 2002 , Barbieri and Levy 1999 , Oneal and Russett 1997 . Few papers have addressed the question of the quantitative impact of conflict itself (or its absence) on trade.
For those papers that do, the empirical results are mixed. Of course theoretically it seems natural that military conflict should reduce trade among adversaries, through trade embargoes, seizures, and other disruptions. This however has proven to be somewhat difficult to empirically verify. Pollins (1989) , van Bergeijk (1994) , Mansfield and Bronson (1997) and Glick and Taylor (2006) estimate gravity models and find that conflict lowers trade. In contrast, Morrow et al. (1998) , Mansfield and Pevehouse (2000) , and Penubarti and Ward (2000) also utilize gravity models and find no statistically significant effects of conflict on trade.
There are, however, a number of defects with the above-cited literature. First and most im-portantly, these studies are typically plagued by endogeneity because they focus on trade among adversaries. The studies simultaneously analyze trade between countries i and j and conflict between i and j; the obvious inter-linkages between these two variables severely complicates causal analysis. The result has been a kind of intellectual bifurcation -among the "internationalists," the political scientist states "trade promotes peace;" the economist avers "peace promotes trade." The primary direction of causality still remains unsettled. Secondly, these studies do not account for the extent of the warring power's ability to damage trade. Fighting with a country that has little global reach should scarcely influence international trade volumes. But such an intensive measure of conflict (how "powerful" is your foe?) is rarely used in the literature. Instead, extensive measures of conflict (do you have a foe?) are typically used to capture the effects of conflict on trade.
Finally, most studies use pooled, rather than panel, estimators that may not adequately control for omitted country-or pair-specific attributes, nor effectively distinguish between the effects of conflict on trade across country pairs and the effects over time (Glick and Taylor 2005 is the exception).
To deal with these issues in the study of the effects of conflict on trade, we explore a new approach by focusing on third parties in this international system of commerce -sea powers. Social scientists and naval historians largely take it for granted that the navies of hegemonic powers have had tremendous influence on international trade. That seapower has been used as a national defense strategy to protect one's own merchant trade and commercial interests remains fairly uncontroversial (see for example Lewis 1953 , Crowhurst 1977 , Harding 1999 . But the public good nature of seapower gives rise to a host of potential international externalities that may either help or harm the trade of other nations.
Thus following Glick and Taylor (2006) we use a gravity model with panel data utilizing country-pair fixed effects estimation, so that we control for any time-invariant country-pair characteristics. But rather than focus on trade and war between countries i and j simultaneously, we focus on trade between i and j and war between i and k, where k is some naval power. We believe that concentrating our attention on the spillover effects of third-party navies will give us another view of the causal effects of military expenditures on international trade. This third party approach is illustrated in Figure 1 .
Indeed, it may be argued that an extensive measure of conflict will be more prone to endogeneity problems than an intensive measure. The decision to go to war with a nation will surely be based on a host of international factors, including trade and military strength. Trade however is unlikely to factor into a military power's decision to subsequently build up its military strength. For example, a naval power k might build up a strong navy for many reasons unrelated to trade between countries i and j. Indeed, if anything naval power and trade may be positively relatedas antagonistic country i starts to trade more, it may spur naval power k to build a stronger fleet.
Thus any endogeneity bias would conceivably be in the positive direction -a negative estimate for the coefficient on k's naval strength would strongly point to the antagonistic fleet causing trade to decline.
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Figure 2 diagrammatically represents some of these ideas. While most studies focus on the extensive effect of conflict between 2 counties on the trade between those two countries (dotted line), we focus on the effects of conflict between a trading country and a naval power (red line). Further, the total decrease in trade will be due not just to the conflict itself, but also the extent by which the naval power can damage trade. Thus the total adverse effect on trade between countries i and j is (φ 1 + φ 2 * Seapower k )
Because of the panel nature of this analysis, our study is thematic; most of the navalist literature on the other hand tends to be episodic. The downside to our approach is that we cannot break down the effects of individual battles, or determine the number of ships involved in each conflict, or even verify that a country's navy had any involvement in the conflict at all.
2 As we will see, our measures of seapower do not measure naval forces engaged in explicit combat, only the naval capability to engage in combat. But what we lose in precision we make up for in breadth, by utilizing a wide panel of trade, navy and conflict data to draw general conclusions on the historic importance of naval power for international trade. This has heretofore never been attempted, although the general lessons that come out of such a study should be of interest to both naval and economic historians. We should highlight that we are not attempting to quantify the total effects of naval power on inter-state commerce. Our far less ambitious project simply attempts to see whether variations in "protagonistic" and "antagonistic" naval powers can help explain variations in trade patterns. The fact that it seems to does not allow us to say anything about the net effects on trade. It does however tell us that fighting naval forces have hurt trade, and that friendly naval forces have helped it.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses some issues concerning the nature of seapower and the general empirical strategy. Section 3 looks on the 18th century case of English trade and highlights some of the pitfalls of a "naive" gravity approach. Section 4 presents the main empirical methodology and results for the 19th and 20th century case. Section 5 concludes.
1 A parallel may be drawn from the crime prevention literature. Calculating the marginal effectiveness of prevention is complicated by the fact that greater crime induces greater efforts towards prevention. Thus a negative relationship between crime and prevention would highlight the effectiveness of prevention efforts.
2 For example, see Davis and Engerman (2006) for a fascinating account of specific naval blockades in history.
2 Seapower and Trade
The Spillovers from Large Navies
Have navies traditionally been strong forces of maritime trade destruction in the past? Or have they instead served to help facilitate the flow of international trade? This is a challenging question to address, in part because of the complicated interconnections between naval power and maritime trade. Understanding these interconnections requires to some extent an understanding of the objectives of any large navy. The historical strategic missions of the U.S. Navy, for example, can be categorized into four general groups: freedom of the seas (or 'sea control'), deterrence, forward presence, and power projection (Cutler 2002) . Efforts designed to promote freedom of the seas and to deter potential attacks might be considered forces that promote trade, particulary trade between the naval power and the rest of the world. Projecting one's power or increasing one's presence internationally, on the other hand, may be thought of as potential hindrances to trade, particularly trade between countries hostile to the naval power.
As the focus of this study is on the spillover effects of naval power on international trade, we look to the possible ways that such power projections can indirectly effect international commerce, either positively or adversely. Adverse actions include guerre de course strategies, blockades and embargoes, and other less explicit forms of economic warfare. Such strategies are often designed to sever the trading links between the enemy and her allies or neutral countries, and in so doing, to reduce the level of military and civilian goods that are available to support her military endeavors. On the other hand, navies are also intended to protect one's own trade, and as such may help bolster trade between itself and other allied nations. While our conflict and alliance data will not distinguish between these various uses of naval power, we should understand that our measures will capture (and lump together) many of these tactics.
Perhaps the most explicit (and oldest) form of economic combat using naval forces is the strategy of guerre de course. Guerre de course (literally "war of race") refers to a naval strategy that is aimed at raiding and destroying the commerce of an enemy as a primary war strategy, as opposed to the traditional goal of acquiring command of the sea. This strategy has typically been used by smaller inferior naval powers whose own commerce may be threatened by a superior navy. The fledgling U.S. navy pursued this tactic against Great Britain during the War of 1812, as did the French against Britain in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and the Germans against the Allied powers in both world wars.
Indeed, this phenomenon of commerce-raiding has a long history, going back to the emergence of the nation-state in the 16th century. It echoes the traditional mercantilist view of a fixed global volume of trade, in which case limiting a rival nation's exports will likely increase your exports. Thus commerce-raiding was viewed as a way both to debilitate a foreign nation and to enrich your own nation. Historically, limited naval capability compelled nations to authorize private warships, or "privateers," to engage in commerce-raiding activities at sea (by issuing letters of marque). However, as navies grew stronger and more specialized and merchant ships distinguished themselves from warships, the power of privateers began to erode in the early 19th century. Still, privateering was considered to be enough of a nuisance for countries to agree to outlaw it by the Declaration of Paris in 1856.
3 After this point commerce-raiding was predominantly a function of professional navies. The decision of a naval power to pursue a guerre de course strategy has been motivated in the past by many factors. Britain's dependence on overseas food supplies for example has forever tempted the French into the guerre de course stance, in the hopes that food shortages would foment social and labor unrest and thus weaken England militarily. Further, France's geographic proximity to England made this policy all the more tempting, as French ships could be easily placed in the North Sea, the Channel and the Atlantic where great volumes of British trade passed (Mahan 1890) . Along with strategic and geographic considerations, technological changes have shaped the decision to engage in commerce-raiding. For example, the use of steam technology made guerre de course more costly (as it allowed merchant ships, no longer dependent on the wind, greater leverage to deviate from their original trade routes), while the advent of torpedo boats and submarines made guerre de course more effective (as merchant ships became far more vulnerable to forms of nautical ambush).
These offensive uses of seapower can have serious consequences for international commerce, but sea-faring nations have always highlighted the defensive uses of this power to justify a robust navy in the first place. In stark contrast to the guerre de course strategy, a guerre d'escadre (literally "war of squadron") strategy involves command and control of the sea, the ultimate strategic ideal for the big navy and apparatus designed for the defense of one's own trade. Large navies may escort and protect merchant ships in transit through convoys, to defend either against guerre de course or general piracy. Even during peacetime, a state with a global trading position will wish to assure itself of the ability to protect its trade from the very offensive actions noted above by other navies, as well as hostilities from third parties (such as terrorists or pirates). This requires protection of trade routes, choke points, and access to critical areas. In arguing for a strong navy, these needs are often cast in terms of protecting vital commodities, such as oil; 4 other times they are seen as a general requirement for protection of an entire trading system vulnerable to potential threats.
Thus the navalist literature seems to focus either on guerre de course strategies, performed by smaller war vessels and aimed at destroying an enemy's trade, or guerre d'escadre, performed by large war vessels and aimed at protecting one's own trade. A casual read of naval history elevates the grand warships as protectors of commerce and guardians of prosperity. The spoilers of trade in contrast were fiendish frigates and sneaky submarines, or worse still, privateers contracted by weaker naval powers ill-equipped to intercept enemy cargo vessels themselves. Alfred Mahan's grand vision of the "great white fleet" thus appears to be a nobel one, utterly consistent with the world of unprecedented commerce about which he was writing.
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But we would argue that large vessels can cause damage to maritime trade precisely because of their size and power. Of course it is true that history is rife with episodes of smaller war vessels conducting guerrilla raids on traders (French privateers during the Revolutionary/Napoleoninc Wars, German U-boats during World War I, etc.). But these raids were necessarily confined to trade routes close to the home country (both French privateers and German submarines focused their aggression on nearby England). For example, looking at the actual letters of marque issued by the English Court of Admiralty during the 18th century shows that British privateers operated mostly locally (Gathmann and Hillman 2007) . Only large ships of global reach have the potential to disrupt maritime commerce conducted on distant waters. As intercontinental trade rapidly grew throughout the 19th century, then, the potential damage to trade by large war vessels relative to small vessels grew as well.
Further, only large vessels have the ability to effectively blockade an enemy nation, perhaps the most commercially destructive action a navy can perform. For while guerre de course is a strategy of irritation, blockades and embargoes are policies aimed at utter strangulation, and these are ambitious methods employed by big navies. While navalists often distinguish between the naval blockade (which limits only the movement of military forces) and the commercial blockade (which explicitly aims at stopping trade), either will conceivably disrupt commercial activity (Brodie 1944) . The typical aim is to reduce the enemy's ability to effectively carry out military operations. Among commercial blockades, those intended to starve or weaken the enemy's population by reducing the importation of food and other necessities have traditionally received the most attention; however, blockades also have been aimed at imports of war munitions and critical raw materials such as petroleum and domestically-scarce minerals. In addition to reducing imports, blockades often have been used as a more mercantilistic tool to prevent exports. In this latter case, the goal is usually to erode the enemy's ability to obtain the funds needed to pay for imported resources. Either way, a blockade will dramatically cut the enemy's volume of bilateral trade if implemented effectively.
There are also a variety of naval actions by large vessels that can have some (often ambiguous) impact on trade on a smaller scale. These include gunboat diplomacy, showing the flag, policing territorial waters, ensuring "good order," and enforcing treaty rights of passage. Often these actions involve nothing more than displaying one's fleet off a foreign country's coast. Gunboat diplomacy for example refers to the pursuit of some foreign policy objective through the use or threat of limited naval force. Very often threat alone can achieve the objective. Naturally these actions fall short of war; nevertheless, they are coercive and can either help or hurt trade, depending on the nature of the dispute. For example, the U.S. maintained an Asiatic squadron of ships in the Far East during the 19th and 20th centuries in part to advance American commercial interests; as such it is conceivable that trade between the U.S. and China prospered while simultaneously trade between China and Japan suffered as a result of this naval influence.
The thing here to stress is that large war ships can influence the scope and direction of maritime trade in a number of ways. This will be more true in the 19th and 20th century context (when distant intercontinental trade became substantial) than the 18th century (when smaller war vessels performed the bulk of commerce raiding through guerre de course), although large naval ships may still exert positive or negative effects on trade in earlier periods. Further, navies constructed for one thing are often charged to do something else -for example, vessels originally built to police the Pacific Ocean may suddenly be called upon to blockade a new enemy in the Atlantic. Indeed, when it comes to the effects of large navies on trade, ex ante strategies scarcely matter -a ship designed for guerre d'escadre can be just as effective in blocking trade (through blockades or general power projections) as ships designed for raiding commerce.
Thus large naval vessels can produce international spillover effects on the maritime activities of other countries. For example, the Athenian Navy during the second Peloponnesian War (431 B.C.E. to 404 B.C.) had become the largest and most powerful fleet ever known. This navy's provision of security along the Aegean Sea's trade routes was a public good susceptible to freeriding by other merchants (Neal 1994 ). For our study of the eighteen to twentieth centuries, as conflicts and alliances spring up, existing navy ships can be used to hinder the trade of enemies or help the trade of allies.
6 Irrespective of past strategic intent, the size of naval fleets or past expenditures on naval construction may serve as explanatory variables for current international trade and commerce.
Empirical Strategy
We begin with the standard gravity model of international trade, which predicts bilateral trade flows based on the economic sizes of and distances between two countries. The basic theoretical model for trade between country i and country j takes the form of 6 A nineteenth century example of this kind of free-riding would be the 1823 Monroe Doctrine, which declared the Western Hemisphere off limits to intervention by European powers and certainly helped bolster U.S. commerce. Of course such a doctrine could only be sustained by the power of the allied Royal Navy (Findlay and O'Rourke 2007) .
where T rade ij is the bilateral trade flow between countries i and j, Y is each country's GDP, Dist ij is the geographic distance between the two countries, and C is a constant. To this basic setup has been added additional factors such as language relationships, tariff levels, contiguity, and colonial history. While these additional factors have been shown to explain trade patterns, they are often constant over time, and thus their effects cannot be gauged when using countrypair fixed effects estimation (as is our goal).
In analyzing the effects of shifting naval power on bilateral trade flows, we will amend (1) so that our new model is
where P rotagF leet ij is a measure of the naval power of the "protagonistic fleet" and AntagF leet ij is a measure of the naval power of the "antagonistic fleet." Conceptually, one should consider a protagnostic fleet to be the naval fleet of country i's or j's ally. We would predict that the power or global reach of a "friendly" navy should be positively related to bilateral trade flows. On the other hand, an antagonistic naval power can be considered a type of "iceberg cost" that increases the costs of transporting goods over seas, and thus lowers the total amount of a country's trade volume. A naval power becomes "antagonistic" when an international conflict erupts between this power and one or both trading partners. Let us define "naval war" or "naval conflict" as a situation where country i and/or country j is fighting a country with a navy with global reach. The primary purpose of this study is to analyze how this antagonistic fleet can damage a country's trade.
How might we actually measure the extent of this power? We next turn to addressing this question.
Measuring Seapower
In any study of naval strength at the country level, three general issues must be addressedthe appropriate measure of naval power within a country, the comparability of measures across countries, and the comparability of measures across time.
The first issue deals with the appropriate "size" of the navy -which ships should be deemed relevant to the study? Clearly the answer to this will depend on the nature of the study. For us, we are primarily concerned with ships that have "global reach" -that is, ships which can be sent to far off places, that can go on extended excursions, and that have sufficient warfare capability to damage the enemy. These vessels can be considered the international "strongarm" of the military, and thus be viewed as those ships able to affect international commerce. At any given time only a handful of naval powers had such capability. For example, the smaller navies at the turn of the 20th century (e.g. Italy, Austria, Spain, Turkey, Sweden, Brazil, etc.) were considered only "coastal defense" navies. While they certainly had the ability to defend and influence their own trade, they did not have the superpower status necessary to influence the bilateral trade of others. Indeed it is the superpower status of these navies that make them relevant as third-party factors. Hence we will focus only on ships with global reach.
The second issue deals with comparing naval strengths across countries. Again, looking only at superpower navies may help alleviate some of the concerns that come from naval heterogeneities, as all the superpowers were more or less at the cutting edge of naval technology. Of course we know this is not strictly true; for example, Portuguese ships in the 15th and 16th centuries (part of a global power navy at the time) tended to be much heavier than their English, Dutch, and French counterparts because they were built for the long route to India (Thomson 1994) . And the 19th century U.S. Navy had been a technological laggard relative to the U.K. for most of its existence (McBride 2000) . But much as we do not expect a great deal of technological differences between Japan, German and the U.S. in current leading industries such as automobiles or food processing, 7 we do not believe that ship design and effectiveness should vary tremendously between those at the forefront of naval development. For example, the tradition of the Royal Navy had always been not to push innovation itself, which tended to devalue existing ships, but only to respond to innovation made by others. Thus patterns of naval development tended to follow across countries quite closely. This brings up the third and perhaps most thorny issue -naval technological growth. From the seventeenth century to the mid-nineteenth century, the relevant global warship was the ship-ofthe-line. The importance of these ships stemmed from the naval tactic known as the line-of-battle, where two columns of opposing ships would manoeuvre to maximize the number of broadside guns to bear. Because these engagements were almost invariably won by the heaviest ships carrying the most powerful guns, the natural growth of naval technology involved building the largest, most powerful sailing vessels possible. So naval strength before 1860 is easily measured as the number of ships-of-the-line with a minimum number of guns.
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But by 1860 these wooden ships-of-the-line were rendered naval dinosaurs by the development and gradual application of a variety of new weaponry, including explosive shells, armor-clad battleships, torpedoes, mines, and ramrods (apparently resurrected from the galley era). Thus the Industrial Revolution had finally by this time penetrated naval technology. Explosive shells -first used at the Battle of Sinope in the Crimean War -obsoleted wooden hulls; steam engines obsoleted sail technology. But the trial-and-error experimentation of the period 1859-90 creates a comparativist's nightmare. No longer is the minimum-gun criteria applicable, but what should replace it? In contrast to the amazing stability of the wooden sailing-ship phase, the new ironclads (many of which were not ocean-going battleships despite occasional claims to the contrary) become obsolete very quickly. Iron plating gave way to steel ships, but at various times in each navy's history. The confusion of the period is best summed up by Padfield (1973) : "It is unnecessary to catalogue the incredible misdirections, false starts, unsightly and unhandy steam kettles, half submerged, double elliptical, rhinoceros-skinned misfits weighted down by huge turrets swaddling one or two ponderous barrel-like pieces, which marked the fearful adolescence of the ironclad."
Yet out of the haze a new global standard for global naval ships emerged by 1880 -the firstclass battleship, once again capable of assuming a front-rank position in the fleet battle-line. The minimal threshold was no longer primarily in terms of the number of guns carried but rather in the range of these guns. The principal naval competitors increasingly built similar, if not identical, kinds of battleships, and use of internationally comparable ratings (i.e. first class, second class, third class) for battleships re-emerged in the 1880s.
But the reign of these ships was relatively short-lived due to the development of an even more advanced battleship type -the Dreadnought. Inspired by the lessons of the Battle of Tsushima between Russia and Japan in 1905, where long range fire had decided the battle, the British commissioned the first Dreadnought in 1906. For a time pre-Dreadnought ships (with a main battery of four guns and a top speed of 18 knots) co-existed with Dreadnoughts (with 10 guns and a top speed of 21 knots). But the clear inferiority of the pre-Dreadnoughts render them as inappropriate measures of 'global power ships' after 1913.
9 Luckily for comparatavists, the Dreadnoughts were usually treated as a relatively homogenous class of fighting ship despite their comparatively long reign ).
Thus we see that our longitudinal study is frustrated by the use of different ships at different times. In contrast to the smoother escalation of the minimal number of guns that needed to be carried for front-line duties in earlier centuries, the changes in naval technology in the late 1850s, the early 1880s and 1906 practically forced the maritime powers of the time to start from scratch.
To deal with these complications, we turn to Modelski and Thompson (1988) , who have amassed a collection of data from various sources to quantify the historical global reach of navies. Doggedly comparatavist, the study takes great pains to control for quality differences among the naval fleets wherever possible. From predominantly country-specific sources, the authors construct time series for ships-of-the-line, 19th century battleships, pre-Dreadnoughts, and Dreadnoughts, as well naval expenditures for six naval powers from 1816 -1938 (measured in millions of 1913 £s). Figure IV plots out some of these measures.
Of course a more general solution to our discontinuity problem consists of merging ship counts with the more stable (in the comparative sense) indicator of naval expenditures. Although naval expenditures have the advantage of greater continuity, they possess too many limitations of comparability to rely upon them as an exclusive indicator of seapower. Hence we will use both expenditure and count data to measure seapower.
3 A Naive Approach -the "Long" Eighteen Century
Empirical Strategy
For the "long" 18th century (1710-1822) we analyze English trade only, treating the English navy as the main protagonistic fleet and the French navy as the main antagonistic fleet. From the late seventeenth century until the final ending of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815, France and Britain were overtly at war more than 50 percent of the time, in addition to their frequent and quite visible manifestations of commercial rivalry (Clodfelter 1992) . While England was bent on using her navy to protect her commercial interests, France wished to severely limit England's "naval-industrial complex" (O'Brien 2002). Thus for our 18th century study of English trade, we view the English navy as the main protagonistic fleet and the French navy as the main antagonistic fleet, amending (2) to
This gravity model needs to be transformed so that it can be empirically verified. We specify the bilateral level of trade between England and another region j as a function of the log of the product of their GDPs, the log of the product of their GDPs per capita, the logged distance between the two regions, the effects of England being at war, and the effects exerted by the global naval powers of the time:
where Dist j is the great circle distance between England and region j, Colony j is an indicator variable which equals 1 if j was/is an English colony (essentially a North America dummy), N avalW ar t is an indicator variable which equals 1 if England is at war with another naval power at time t, and P wrShips kt is the number of ships-of-the-line owned by naval power k at time t. Note that our 18th-century power-ship measures only include the intensive measure of antagonistic naval power. Since England and France were consistent rival nations during the 18th century, this is appropriate because some degree of hostility always existed throughout this period.
Data Sources
For our simple 18th century study of English trade we rely on Deane and Mitchell (1962) for English bilateral trade between 7 general regions from 1710 -1820.
10 GDP and population statistics for these regions are compiled from Maddison (2001) for the years 1700 and 1820, and are geometrically interpolated to construct annual series. For ships-of-the-line we use the Modelski and Thompson (1988) 
Estimation Results
We begin by estimating (4) using the English trade data from 1710-1822 with seven trade partners. In this earlier study, potentially antagonistic naval powers (size of the French fleet, Spanish fleet, etc.) evolve only in the time dimension; as such year dummies are not included. Luckily there is a lot of time variation in the number of ships-of-the-line maintained by each navy during this period (see Figure IV ) . Table 2 presents some of our findings. Specifications 3 and 4 include all five navies with global power; French naval power is consistently associated with lower English trade, while British naval power is associated with higher English trade. What is perhaps surprising is that despite France's reliance on guerre de course and small-ship guerrilla raids on English commerce, their large naval vessels appear to have inflicted some damage as well. Specification 6 looks at only English and French naval power and includes pair-fixed effects. Here it would appear that English and French power vessels were fairly equally matched -one extra French ship-of-the-line is associated with a 0.8% decline of British trade, while one extra English ship-of-the-line is associated with a 0.8% 10 These regions are Northern Europe, Southern Europe, British North America, the United States, Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
11 Glete (1993) has similar measures for this time period, as well as measures for smaller vessels, but only in 5-year intervals. 12 These regions are Austria, Denmark, England, German states, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and her colonies, Spain and her colonies, Sweden, Switzerland, the United States, Hanseatic Cities, the Ottoman Empire, Prussia, and Russia. For the first eleven regions we were able to match income and population statistics from Maddison (1995) .
increase in British trade. While the English figures are likely to be upward biased (greater trade will induce the English to build a stronger navy to defend it), the French figures seem to imply that their large vessels did in fact contribute to the disruption of English commerce. For the years between 1793 and 1815, with only a small pause with the Peace of Amiens from the spring of 1802 until the spring of 1803, the major fight for dominance in Europe was between France and England (Davis and Engerman 2006) . Further, each country used their navies as tools for mercantilistic policies to restrict the trade of neutral nations with their rival. Thus we have a natural experiment that allows us to gauge the effect of each country's navy on the other country's trade volume.
13 As England and France were antagonistic towards each other throughout this time period, we needn't distinguish between the extensive and intensive margins of conflict; thus we estimate a version of equation (4). Results are reported in Table 3 . The fixed effects model is as parsimonious as possible, as fleet sizes are the only independent variables that vary over time, and these models fail to explain most of the actual variations in bilateral trade. Still, it is interesting to observe that each naval power appears to have been able to limit the other nation's trade -for each extra ship-of-the-line, roughly 2% of the enemy's trade is lost. All considered, the ships-of-the-line used in Continental System of France and the British blockade did have an impact on the magnitude of international commerce, as well as on the geographic pattern of trade. Pitting England and France against each other in this fashion is tempting for the amateur historian, but can be problematic when studying their effects on each other's commerce. Their close proximity to each other gives greater prominence to smaller vessels, and to guerre de course strategies in general. And in fact during this period it was the smaller vessels (chiefly 5th and 6th rates, and even unrated vessels) that carried out the bulk of war against enemy trade (Hill 1999; Wareham 2001) . And as mentioned earlier, privateers were a much more significant impediment to trade in the 18th century than later on, further vitiating the significance of larger war vessels. Not surprisingly then, the explanatory power of large vessels is quite limited for this time period.
The Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries
The difficulties in the 18th century context motivate us to develop a different approach. The world we would like to investigate is one where inter-continental trade is relatively large, where large naval vessels have significant global reach, and where there are many trading partners. In this world we can view large naval powers as third parties that exert externalities upon the trading world -thus country i may have lower trade with country j because it is fighting with naval power k, while i may have higher trade with j because it has an alliance with naval power l. Only in a world of many bilateral trading partners can we thus hope to determine the causal effects of such conflicts and alliances. Due in part to England's naval successes during the long eighteenth century, the world of the 19th and early 20th centuries was indeed a globalized one. It is this world to which we next turn.
Measures of Naval Power
We would like to empirically test equation (2) for 19th -20th century trade for a wide range of trading partners. But what measures should we use for P rotagF leet ij and AntagF leet ij ? The answer to this is somewhat easier for the 18th century case of English trade; the two primary naval powers of the time, England and France, were constantly at war with each other and maintained very comparable ships-of-the-line in their fleets. But for the broader 19th -20th century study, where there are many trading country-pairs, things are more complicated. Two primary issues come to mind.
1) Changes in Relevant Ships.
The question of what constitutes a "power ship," that is, a naval vessel that has enough global reach to affect something like international commerce in faroff waters, has nettled navalists for some time. As discussed in section 2.3, technological progress in shipping and warfare had rendered useless (at least from a global power perspective) wooden sailing warships in the 1860s, iron-hulled warships in the 1880s, pre-Dreadnought battleships in the 1910s, and Dreadnought battleships in the 1940s. Thus producing long time-series of comparable naval capabilities for naval powers is challenging.
2) Changes in Conflict. As international alliances and conflicts between naval powers and other nations flare up and die out, the size/scope of each country's "protagonistic navy" and "antagonistic navy" fluctuates over time. Figure III provides us some sense of the variation of conflicts between nations over time, where at least one of the warring countries is a naval power. For example, whether or not the United States Navy is a detriment to trade between Mexico and Venezuela will depend on whether or not the U.S. Navy should be considered part of the antagonistic fleet of this particular trading pair. From the figure, we see that it should be considered part of the antagonistic fleet in the early 1840s (due to fighting between the U.S. and Mexico) and in the early 1900s (due to fighting between the U.S. and Venezuela).
Thus we have two interacting measures of "naval power" that evolve over time. To exploit these variations, we construct the following measure of antagonistic naval power for each countrypair:
where W ar is a dummy variable indicating whether or not one of the trading partners (i or j) is currently in conflict with a naval power (k), P owerShips is the number of global power war ships currently available to k, and N is the number of global naval powers. The first term on the right-hand-side is the antagonistic fleet measure applicable for country i, while the second term is the antagonistic fleet measure for country j.
14 An analogous measure is used for P rotagF leet. Instead of using a war dummy, however, we use the dummy variable Ally to indicate whether or not one of the trading partners currently has a formal alliance with a naval power.
(Ally ik P owerShips k + Ally jk P owerShips k )
Note that the measure P owerShips are ships considered to have global reach at the time. Due to obsolescence, then, we must divide our sample into four distinct time periods -before 1860, P owerShips are ships-of-the-line; from 1861-1879 they are battleships; from 1880 -1913 they are pre-Dreadnoughts; from 1906 -1940 they are Dreadnoughts.
We would also like to construct longer series of comparable naval statistics so that we might run longer panels. Of course our efforts here are frustrated by the adoption and obsolescence of different naval vessels throughout our 120 years of study. Here there are two things we can do. One is to use naval expenditure data, which is available for the U.K, France, and the United States back to 1816, and for all six naval powers back to 1875. These expenditures can then be used to construct "capital stocks" of naval capacity. Of course this procedure implicitly assumes that 1 £ spent on the Royal Navy during some year translates into the same increase in global power as 1 £ spent on the U.S. Navy during the same year. This is somewhat complicated by the different technological levels of each Navy (for example, it is well documented that the U.S. Navy lagged far behind the Royal Navy in technology adoption throughout the late 19th century). Furthermore, there may be great heterogeneities in the share of overall expenditures in each country going to "global power vessels" (for example, the early U.S. Navy operated more like the Coast Guard, appropriating most of its funds towards shoreline activities and very little towards vessels with global reach) (McBride 2000) . Nonetheless, so long as these differences are not too excessive, this procedure produces a fair measure of naval power, comparable across all the powers.
With this in mind, we construct naval capital stocks as:
14 Here we should note that we can also control for potential distance effects by constructing an alternate measure of antagonistic fleet per unit distance:
where AvgDist is an arithmetic average of the great circle distances between i and k and between j and k. The overall conclusions do not change, so these results are not reported.
where I kT is investment in naval capital by naval power k at time T , and δ is the annual depreciation rate of N avalCapital. We arbitrarily set δ = 0.9. Also arbitrary is how far back we use investment data to construct the stock of capital, which here is 10 years. Analogous to (5), we interact war dummies with this naval capital measure to produce an antagonistic naval measure relevant for countries i and j:
And analogously for our protagonistic measure we have
Replacing AntagF leet with AntagCapital and P rotagF leet with P rotagCapital in our specifications allows us to experiment with an alternative measure of naval power, one that is comparable both across countries and across the 19th and 20th centuries, thus allowing us to use a longer panel.
The other thing we can do is connect our ship measures in such a way as to try to make them comparable across the entire 1820 -1940 time period. To do this we simply assume that each new kind of power ship is twice as effective as its predecessor. Thus we construct "Ships-of-the-Line equivalents" such that:
1 Dreadnought = 2 pre-Dreadnoughts = 4 Battleships = 8 Ships-of-the-Line Thus having a Dreadnought in your fleet in 1940 is considered equivalent to owning 8 ships-ofthe-line in 1860. Further, once a series ends (in Modelski and Thompson, Ships-of-the-Line end in 1860, Battleships in 1879, and pre-Dreadnoughts in 1913), we depreciate the remaining ships by 10% each year thereafter.
15 Thus here we attempt to capture some aspects of technological progress and obsolescence in naval ships, albeit in an admittedly very crude way. 
Empirical Strategy
In order to judge the validity of our idea we need to transform equation (2) so that we can empirically test it.
For our broader study of the period 1820-1940, with many bilateral trade partners, thirdparty naval powers can be considered friend, foe or neutral. Thus distinguishing between the extensive and intensive effects of naval conflict makes sense in this context. For this case, we specify the bilateral level of trade between any two countries i and j as a function of the log of the product of their GDPs, the log of the product of their GDPs per capita, other non-evolving control variables, the effect of their being at war with each other, and the effects of their being either at war or in alliance with naval powers:
where Lang ij is an indicator variable which equals 1 if i and j share the same primary language, W ar ijt is an indicator variable which equals 1 if i and j are in conflict with each other, and N avalW ar ijt is an indicator variable which equals 1 if either i or j is in conflict with some naval power k at time t. Note that here we are separating the possible deleterious effects of fighting a global power between the extensive margin of conflict (the effect of fighting a nation with global reach, captured by φ 1 ) and the intensive margin of conflict (the effect of the extent of that global power's reach, captured by φ 2 ). While our primary interest is in the intensive margin, separating these two effects is important; we should make sure that trade falls not only because there is a fight with a global power, but also because that country's power fleet can exert an influence on commerce.
16
Notice that we include a country-pair fixed effects term α ij in each specification. When running our fixed effects model, the trade effects of those variables that do not evolve over time can not be estimated. Indeed, many of the variables traditionally used in the gravity model literature, such as distances, land areas and common languages, will be implicitly absorbed in the α term. Also notice that time dummies are included in the specification.
16 One might question the validity of the above specification if there were a significant number of observations where no trade at all existed between countries i and j. However, between 1820 and 1940, our sample includes less than 20 observations where bilateral trade is marked zero, so that a TOBIT specification would be inappropriate.
As our focus is on the estimation of φ 2 and φ 3 , an important question is whether or not our measure AntagF leet and P rotagF leet can be treated as exogenous variables. We feel that they can for a number of reasons. The first and most obvious point is that, as a third party, the naval power is not a trading partner, only a warring or friendly one. Second, any influence of trade between i and j on k's decision to go to war will be absorbed by φ 1 , not φ 2 . Finally, any effect of trade between i and j on k's naval expenditures will most likely be positive if k is an enemy, not negative. To cope with this potential feedback, however, we may throw out of our sample those cases where a naval conflict has lasted over a year. The reason for this is that it takes time to build a ship -if the enemy's trade is a source of consideration for naval build-up, it will likely take at least a year from the time of deciding on new naval construction to the time of deploying the new vessel. As it happens, most conflicts do not last as long as that -out of all the conflicts relevant for our study, only around 15% last one year or longer. That is, conflicts tend to flare up and die out with great frequency. Thus for most of our sample, there would be no opportunity to change expenditures in response to the enemy's trade; the existing fleet would have to be used instead. When discarding those cases of longer conflict (mostly observations during the Great War), all our results firmly hold.
Finally, we wish to estimate the effects of an antagonistic or protagonistic country spending resources building its naval fleet on bilateral trade. Thus we estimate:
where AntagCapital and P rotagCapital are constructed according to equations (8) and (9).
17
Note that here we specify year dummies as well -while naval expenditures only evolve over the time dimension, the W ar dummies for i and j evolve both over time and over country pairs. Thus, similar to (10), we can specify the whole range of country-pair fixed effects and time effects.
18
17 We also use the alternative, more lagged measure N avalCapital kT = 10 t=2 δ t I k,T −t in constructing antagonistic capital stocks. This is to further limit any possibility of reverse causation. Results do not vary.
18 Note that we do not log any of our naval measures because many observations are zero. Thus φ 2 and φ 3 will always be interpreted as semi-elasticity measures.
Data Sources
The final dataset used for the 19th and 20th century study is a match-merge of data that can be split into four categories of interest -trade figures, traditional gravity model data, conflict and alliance data, and naval power data.
The bilateral trade data were assembled from two main sources: Barbieri (1996) and Mitchell (1992 Mitchell ( , 1993 Mitchell ( , 1998 . The Barbieri (1996) dataset contains bilateral trade data in current U.S. dollars for some 60 countries during the period 1870-1947. Here data typically measure bilateral trade between countries i and j by summing imports into i from j and into j from i. We deflate these figures by the U.S. CPI Index. We use trade data from Mitchell (1992 Mitchell ( , 1993 Mitchell ( , 1998 for the 1825-1870 period, as well as to fill in some major gaps in Barbieri's data coverage for 1870-1947. These data are typically reported in local currency units. We converted them into current U.S. dollar terms using the official exchange rate series provided by Global Financial Data and then deflated them by the U.S. CPI.
To this dataset, a number of other standard variables are included to estimate a gravity model; these include real GDP, population, and various country-pair characteristics, such as contiguity, distance, etc. Read GDP and per capita GDP data (in 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars) come predominantly from Maddison (1995 Maddison ( , 2001 , supplemented where necessary by data from Mitchell (1992 Mitchell ( , 1993 Mitchell ( , 1998 . The CIA's World Factbook is used to provide a number of countryspecific variables, including latitude and longitude, land area, physically contiguous neighbors and common languages. Whenever appropriate, we make changes in land area to reflect territorial changes based on two sources, Williamson (2000, 2001) .
Our measures of wars and alliances are constructed from the database on militarized interstate disputes collected by the Correlates of War Project (COW) at the University of Michigan. We use the data set MIDB 3.02, a revised version of the COW dataset MID2.1 compiled by Jones, Bremer, and Singer (1996) . This data set codes the degree of hostility at the participant level, where the participants are sovereign states. The degrees of hostility range from 1 to 5; we code our war variable as conflicts with hostility levels of either 4 or 5 (these include blockades, occupations of territory, seizures, clashes, raids, declarations of war, uses of weaponry, and interstate wars).
19 For ally data, we use the COW Formal Alliance Data Set compiled by Gibler and Sarkees (forthcoming). These data attempt to identify each formal alliance between at least two states that fall into the classes of defense pact, neutrality or non-aggression treaty, or entente agreement. We have Ally ikt equal to one only in cases where naval power k has an explicit defense pact with nation i at year t. While this measure surely excludes some de facto alliances that existed without formal compacts, it will nevertheless capture many of the important de jure allegiances between naval and non-naval nations. Finally, for measures of 19th and 20th century seapower, we use Modelski and Thompson (1988) . As mentioned before, they construct a panel of data on the number of global power ships and naval expenditures from a variety of sources.
Estimation Results
For our broader study of 19th and 20th century trade we estimate equation (10). Here we distinguish between the extensive effects of global conflict, captured by φ 1 , and the intensive effects of global conflict, captured by φ 2 . Note that we might also wish to separate those countrypairs that share a border from those that do not -conceivably, countries at war with a naval power may wish to substitute from maritime trade to land-based trade, where trade with one's neighbor via land routes could serve to shield the nation's commercial activity from possible damage. Table 5 presents some results for the entire sample (this is for the fixed-effects specification; Table 7 presents OLS estimates for the whole sample). Here we split our data into four time groupings in accordance with our four different global power ship measures. Our variable AntagF leet is measured as the number of antagonistic power ships. The coefficient on this measure, φ 2 , is our intensive measure of conflict. P rotagF leet is measured in a similar fashion, expect we use alliance dummies. In three of the four cases, our AntagF leet measure comes in as significantly negative. Specifically, one extra antagonistic ship-of-the-line in the 19th century corresponds to 0.5% lower trade volume, while one extra antagonistic Dreadnought in the 20th century corresponds to 1% lower trade volume. In cases where the effect is not quite as strong as this (pre-Dreadnoughts) or insignificant (Battleships), the gravity model fits quite poorly with low R 2 s. Of course, as we stressed in section 2.3, measures of seapower are quite difficult for these time periods, as the late 19th century was a period of technological transition for the major navies of the world. We also observe that in two of the four cases, protagonistic fleets are associated with higher trade volumes. Table 6 presents parallel results for those country-pairs that share a border. Not surprisingly, both the helpful effects of friendly fleets and the deleterious effects of enemy fleets seem to dissipate. However, it is interesting to note that the effects of AntagF leet on trade remain significantly negative in the case for Dreadnoughts. This may indicate that maritime trade was an important channel of commerce during the first half of the 20th century even among neighboring countries (indeed, within our sample, all nations, including neighboring countries, have access to the sea). Further, it may be difficult if not impossible to quickly switch trade routes due to increased conflict; because of infrastructural issues, such nimbleness is unlikely. Thus, tangling with countries with Dreadnoughts appears to be harmful for your trade, no matter who your trading partner is.
For longer panels, we estimate equation (11) by constructing different measures of N avalCapital using equation (7). Table 8 presents some of the results. For these we use 10 lags of expenditure data. The first specification uses expenditures from the three countries that have data for the whole time period of our study -England, France and the U.S.
20 Specifications 4 and 5 include expenditure data for Russia (4) and for Germany and Japan (5), but for curtailed time periods. For every specification except (4), the intensive effect is estimated to be significantly negative; the extensive effect is estimated to be negative for some specifications as well. Specifically, expenditures are measured in millions of 1913 British pounds. Looking at the last specification, then, a 1 million £ increase in country k's naval expenditures at time t − 1 is expected to lower the global trade of k's adversaries by 0.1% at time t, unconditional on what these funds were actually spent on. Considering that a single global power warship may cost many millions of pounds to produce and maintain, the marginal effect of such a ship on international commerce can be considerable. Thus, a warring global power will further reduce trade volumes with further investments in global power, as proxied by these expenditure measures. Also note that our proxies of protagonistic naval expenditures appear to positively affect trade only for the 19th and early 20th centuries. We have argued that these semi-elasticity measures are both statistically and economically significant. Take for example our last estimates for naval expenditures, and consider the year 1913: across the 312 country-pairs we have in our dataset, there was around 63 billion (1985) dollars worth of trade. Considering that 1 £ in 1913 was worth about $20 in 1985, a 1 million dollar increase in naval expenditures had the potential to destroy over 12 million dollars of trade had that nation been at war with the world. Of course by 1915, the world was at war with itself. Naval powers of global reach had the potential to do great damage to global commerce, and did so often.
Finally, we run (10) using "Ships-of-the-Line equivalents" as measures for AntagF leet and P rotagF leet, as discussed in section 4.1. Results are presented in Table 9 . Crudely attempting to account for technological progress in ship design and technological obsolescence for older vessels does not alter our overall conclusions -antagonistic vessels appear to be harmful to trade for enemy countries, while protagnonistic vessels appear to help the trade of allies.
20 Here we should acknowledge that there may arise some concern that World War I drives much of the results.
As is clear from Figure IV , the naval expenditures dramatically spiked during this time, especially for the U.S. and Great Britain. This war involved extensive efforts by both sides to blockade the others' trade. Indeed, after initial optimism on each side faded, the war increasingly became an economic struggle where victory was ultimately determined by the resources available to each group (Broadberry and Harrison 2005) . For this reason we split the sample between the 19th and 20th centuries, and present them as specifications (2) and (3) respectively. (2) highlights that the War does not drive the results.
Conclusion
This paper constitutes a global historical study linking commercial and military activities on the high seas. We discover that when summoned to antagonistic action, large naval vessels can inflict significant damage to international trade. These vessels can also bolster international commerce for allied countries. Further, we have suggested that our measures are robust to reverse causation issues. These large naval ships, designed for the purposes of a number of ex ante strategic missions, can suddenly be summoned to action to aid an ally or help resolve a dispute. These actions however can produce commerce-shifting spillovers that we have attempted to quantify.
So was the maintenance of global power vessels "worth it" from a commerce perspective? These ships were stabilizing forces during times of peace, but the naval Pax Britannica of the late 19th century and Pax Americana of the 20th century were maintained no doubt at high cost -by one measure, nearly 10% of total English GDP was allocated to the Royal Navy around the turn of the 19th century (O'Brien 1993) . While these naval expenditures produced a variety of commerce-related spillovers, both good and bad, the net effects on trade and globalization in general are difficult to discern. The U.S.'s antagonism towards Japan for example (by entering Tokyo Bay in 1853, quite uninvited) may have initially been disruptive, but surely unleashed subsequent trade in the Far East; such dynamic effects can not be uncovered by our empirical strategy.
Instead we have attempted to quantity the immediate effects of friendly and fighting war vessels, and thus hope to contribute to the literature assessing the historic costs of war on international commerce. Our unique measures of antagonistic naval powers gives us an alternative approach to highlight the effects of war on trade by using third parties as instruments of conflict. These third parties, large super-powers with global reach, could influence international commerce like the Greek gods could affect the doings of mere mortals -unilaterally and without reverse feedback. Thus these "gods of the seas" provide us a convenient tool to assess the costs of war, as well as serve as the focus of future studies on commercial and military links. Figure IV: Naval Data from Modelski and Thompson (1988) Fixed and Year Effects, 1820 -1938 ("Ships-of-the-Line Equivalents") Dependent variable is logged bilateral trade. Year dummies and constant not reported. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
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